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I. INTRODUCTION
Spurred by the advancement of new technologies, copyright law had
well-intentioned beginnings. Its sole purpose was to protect an author's inter-
est in his work by preventing unauthorized multiplication. A minority of
large industry players, however, was still able to exploit writers and advance
their own interests. It has also been argued that the current copyright law
regarding digital media similarly protects the interests of record companies
and large media corporations at the expense of the end users' rights. The
competing interests of users, who want inexpensive and easily accessible me-
dia, and those of the rights owners, who want protection against the unautho-
rized distribution and duplication of their works, make it difficult to achieve
perfect equilibrium. In many regards, the courts have ruled in favor of rights
owners, who have presented arguably conflicting or biased data to support
their claims of financial loss caused by piracy.
This comment will detail the history and purpose of copyright law gen-
erally. Beginning with origins of copyright law and its development in early
America, this paper will examine the central provisions of the Copyright Act
of 1976, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Further, it will
explore how interpretation of those laws-along with technological develop-
ments and hard-line lobbying-has led to the current condition of copyright
law in the United States. Specifically, the comment will focus on the devel-
opment of peer-to-peer file sharing, its shift in structure, and the difficulties
of enforcing copyrights that result from the more recent file-sharing systems.
It will examine the current approaches and possible alternatives of enforcing
piracy law and analyze the weaknesses of specific provisions of the DMCA
as applied to developing technology.
I hope to offer insight into the consumers' psychology regarding piracy
and the effect, if any, of the current enforcement mechanisms on the consum-
ers' attitudes. This comment will also examine what rights consumers have
when purchasing media and how the DMCA affects those rights. The com-
ment will also address arguments of opponents of the DMCA regarding its
limit on fair use through Digital Rights Management Technology and the
stifling effect this has on creativity. Finally, I will offer possible alternatives
to the current copyright regime.
Andrew Johnson is a J.D. Candidate at Southern Methodist University Dedman
School of Law, Class of 2013.
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II. HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. British Ancestry
"A copyright is a property right in an original work of authorship that is
fixed in tangible form."' The concept of owning an interest in an artistic or
literary work sprung from the political and cultural turmoil of the English
Reformation.2 The political purpose of controlling dissemination of informa-
tion, rather than protecting an author's right to his work, ultimately led to the
development of copyright as it is known today.3
During the 16th century, King Henry VIII attempted to censor any writ-
ing that might cause harm to his reign following his break with Rome.4 To
limit what literature was printed, the Crown conferred printers' licenses upon
publishers-giving them the exclusive right to publish only certain works,
authorized by the king, for a set term. 5 This right extended to printing certain
classes of books and sometimes gave the sole right to print a single work.6
The first recorded English copyright had a seven-year duration and was given
to John Palsgrave in 1530 for his treatise on the study of French.7
Religious conflict continued to alter the landscape of this newly devel-
oping area of British law. Notably, King Henry's daughter, Queen Mary I,
attempted to undo her father's break from Rome and return England to the
Roman Catholic faith.8 Borrowing her father's tactics of controlling dissemi-
nation of literature with which she disagreed, she created the Stationer's
Company in 1557 in order to suppress Protestant literature. 9 The Crown man-
dated that all printers and publishers join the Stationer's Company as a way
of supervising, censoring, and licensing all books to be printed.0
In return for submitting to royal control, members were given extreme
latitude in their shrewd business dealings to acquire great profits.'' They
were essentially given a monopoly of all English printing-sanctioned by
I. ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, WHAT Is A COPYRIGHT? 5
(2011).
2. Id.







9. MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 4 (3d ed. 1999).
10. BUGBEE, supra note 3, at 50.
11. Id. at 51-52.
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statute.12 In 1662, the Parliament passed the Licensing Act, which essentially
prohibited building or operating a printing press and printing books without
the approval of the Stationer's Company.13 Moreover, any printing press that
received such approval eventually became the company's property under the
Act.14 The statute assumed a common law ownership of a book where au-
thors were presumably given literary ownership over their works along with
printers and publishers, which was understood to be perpetual.15 These exclu-
sive rights of individual publishers within the Stationer's Company to pub-
lish particular works came to be known as "Stationer's Copyright."16 The
company internally monitored the copyrights of each member by requiring
all books purchased from the authors or members of the Stationer's Company
to be logged in the company's register.17
Authors, on the other hand, were not recognized as truly holding a "Sta-
tioner's Copyright" in their books and played little to no role in this process
since they were not members of the Stationer's Company.18 Publishers
widely exploited authors' rights to their works. An author seeking publica-
tion did not have exclusive control over multiplications of copies, but only
held a single copying privilege.19 Because of unequal bargaining positions
with the Stationer's Company, authors were forced to sell this interest in
order to have their works printed and published.20 Upon acquiring the right, a
publisher could freely make unlimited copies-thus gaining a proprietary in-
terest in the text, while the author essentially relinquished control of his
work.2 1 Traditional copyright, unlike the modem concept, protected the rights
of book manufactures and sellers, not the authors.22
The Long Parliament's passage of the Licensing Order of 1643 reinvig-
orated the Stationer's Company's monopoly on the book trade. It extended
the throne's policy that required all books to be entered into the register and
12. Id. at 50.
13. Brandon Grzandziel, Comment, A New Argument for Fair Use Under the Digi-
tal Millennium Copyright Act, 16 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 171, 175 (2008).
14. Id.
15. BUGBEE, supra note 3, at 51.
16. Grzandziel, supra note 13, at 175.
17. FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, & TRADE-
MARKS 14 (1989).
18. L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USER'S RIGHTS 22 (1992).
19. BUGBEE, supra note 3, at 51.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 18, at 22.
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outlawed the importation of their copies.23 This caused disappointment and
aggravation among the public. In 1644, John Milton published his argument/
speech, Areopagitica, to protest such policies.24 Acting in direct conflict with
the statute of 1643, Milton printed his unlicensed pamphlet without register-
ing it with the Stationer's Company.25 He sought to expose the law for what
it was-a tool for the government's control of ideas-and argued that neces-
sary protections from illegal and libelous works could be secured by less
restrictive means.2 6
A shift in power began when Parliament chose not to renew the Licens-
ing Act after it expired in 1695.27 The sudden end of the Stationer's Com-
pany's monopoly threw the book trade into disorder as they lost the law's
protection for their private copyrights.28 When the booksellers' attempt to
reinstate the former law failed, they sought protections for the authors who
would ultimately assign them the fight to print the work.29 The lobbying suc-
ceeded when the Parliament, under Queen Anne, passed the Statute of Anne
of 1710.30
The Statute of Anne was the first statute to recognize an author's right
to his work, ultimately signifying the first step toward the modern idea of
copyright law.3' The purpose of the Act can be summed up by its title: "An
act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books
in the authors or purchasers of such copies, during the times therein men-
tioned."32 Not only did the act reward authors for their work, unlike former
law, but also it created the public domain for literature.33 The statute limited
copyrights to a specific term of years and allowed free access to previously
protected works.34 Former monopolists, however, continued to benefit from
the new legislation. The statute grandfathered existing Stationer's Copyrights
23. BUGBEE, supra note 3, at 52.
24. Sid Parkinson, Milton's Aeropagitica, THE ST. LAWRENCE INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, http://www.stlawrenceinstitute.org/voll4mit.
html (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Grzandziel, supra note 13, at 176.
28. Id.
29. PATITERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 18, at 27.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 27-28.
33. LEAFFER, supra note 9, at 5.
34. Adrian Johns, Copyright Series Part 9-The Statute of Anne, A New Hope
(1710-1740), SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY, July 8, 2011, http://www.sustainable
diversity.com/?p=74 (last visited Sept. 1, 2012).
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for twenty-one years. 35 Its provision making copyright assignable to others
allowed booksellers to exploit authors.36 In order to make profit, authors had
to assign their copyright to booksellers in order to get their works pub-
lished.37 Although remnants of the old regime lingered, copyright-once
conceived as a publisher's right-became known as an author's right.38
B. Copyright in Early America
Early colonial America-rooted in agriculture and without a formed
identity-had little concern for copyright protection.39 Yet this concern
would move to the forefront as America continued down the path of political
independence, while also attempting to break free from the literary tradition
of Europe.4 0 In the process, many authors became frustrated with the lack of
protection for their works and the lack of appreciation given to them by their
fellow countrymen. 4 1 The Continental Congress had no authority under the
Articles of Confederation to issue copyrights and, prior to 1783, only two
states had passed acts dealing with private copyrights in America.42
In the 1780s, a few American writers commenced a copyright move-
ment-seeking both to protect their works and to forge America's distinctive
literary identity.43 As a result of their petitions, the Continental Congress
formed a committee "to consider the most proper means of cherishing genius
and useful arts throughout the United States by securing to the authors or
publishers of new books their property in such works."44 The Continental
Congress passed a resolution that encouraged states to enact copyright stat-
utes that protected authors for a minimum of fourteen years.45 Within three
years, every state except Delaware had some form of copyright law in
place.46
35. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 18, at 30.
36. Id. at 28.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 31.
39. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent
and Copyright Clause, 49 J. Copy. Socy. 675, 686 (2002), available at http://
law.scu.edu/faculty/File/ochoa-tyler-anti-monopoly.pdf.
40. BUGBEE, supra note 3, at 104.
41. Id.
42. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 39, at 686-87; BUGBEE, supra note 50, at 65-67;
See 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 16, 17 (1994)
43. FOSTER & SHOOK, supra note 17, at 106.
44. Ochoa & Rose, supra note 39, at 686 (citing NATIONAL ARCHIVES, PAPERS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, No. 36, II, folios 113-114).
45. Ochoa & Rose, supra note 39, at 687.
46. Id.
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The concept of protecting a right to one's work embedded itself in
American thinking and became a great concern for early writers and educa-
tors. 47 Fundamental disagreements over the purpose of government and prop-
erty rights caused the political mood to grow tense.48 Wealthy figures-to
whom many ordinary citizens owed debts-threatened to control state legis-
latures, and thus challenged "John Locke's concepts of property as the re-
ward of industry and the security of that property as the chief end of
governmentFalse"49 Many sought to safeguard property rights, which ulti-
mately included protection of intellectual property.
The issue of copyright protection came to a head at the Constitutional
Convention in 1787.50 Both Charles Pickney, who served in the South Caro-
lina Legislature, and James Madison of Virginia submitted proposals to give
Congress the power to grant copyrights.5l Madison saw the copyright clause
as not only a form of protection for authors, but also as a safeguard against
monopolies, which stifled creativity and allowed for the "sacrifices of the
many to the few."52 The final proposed intellectual property clause was ap-
proved unanimously without debate.53 It gave Congress the power "[t]o pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."54 Unlike other clauses that "denominate a sphere of authority
and leave the details to Congress, the Copyright Clause includes specific pa-
rameters for the content of copyright law."55 This reveals the Framers' intent
to constrain Congress from permanently extending copyright protection.56
47. FOSTER & SHOOK, supra note 17, at 128.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 129.
50. See id.
51. Ochoa & Rose, supra note 39, at 688; See also FOSTER & SHOOK, supra note
17, at 128-29.
52. Ochoa & Rose, supra note 39, at 692 (citing Letter from Madison to Jefferson
(Oct. 17, 1788), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 21 (Princeton
1958)).
53. FOSTER & SHOOK, supra note 17, at 129.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
55. Grzandziel, supra note 13, at 177 (citing Marci A. Hamilton, The Historical
and Philosophical Underpinnings of the Copyright Clause, in 5 Occasional Pa-
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The first copyright law enacted by Congress was the Copyright Act of
1790.57 It gave protection to the author of maps, charts, and books for a
fourteen-year term, with a fourteen-year renewal period.58 The statute tracked
much of the language of its English predecessor-the Statute of Anne-in-
cluding protection for previously published works.59
Before being published, an author was required to deposit his book with
the U.S. Secretary of State six months prior to publication and run an adver-
tisement of the facts of publication during the first two months after publica-
tion.60 Once a copyright was established, an infringing publisher who issued
a pirated copy would have to forfeit all copies and pay a fine of fifty cents for
every sheet found, divided between the author and the government. 6' This
Act, however, did not offer copyright protection for foreigners. 62 American
printers and publishers pirated and reprinted foreign books without re-
straint.63 The common view was that literary piracy of foreign works bene-
fited the country-it allowed American publishers to meet the high demand
for imported books at a considerably lower price than had there been copy-
right protection to prohibit the practice.64
The Act underwent a handful of substantial revisions, the first of which
took place in 1831. Largely recognized as the result of the lobbying efforts of
Noah Webster-a prolific writer and lexicographer-the Copyright Act of
1831 consisted of several additions to the original statute. 65 One of the most
significant changes, to Noah Webster's benefit, was the extension of the du-
ration of a copyright.66 The original term was extended from fourteen to
twenty-eight years plus the possible renewal of fourteen years. 67 Other
change included the ability of a widow or children of a deceased author to
57. Copyright Extension, The Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution
and Its Historical Background, available at http://www.copyrightextension.
com/page00.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
58. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790), § 1, available at http://www.copy-
right.gov/history/1790act.pdf
59. Ochoa & Rose, supra note 39, at 695.





65. The Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436, Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-
1900), L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., http:l/copy.law.cam.ac.uk/camltoolsl
request/showRecord.php?id=record ust 831.
66. First General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law, Enacted by the Twenty-first
Congress on February 3, 1831, http://www.ellenwhite.info/copyright law-us_
1831.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
67. Id.
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obtain such a copyright renewal. 68 The new law also broadened protection by
prohibiting reprinting a portion of a book without permission, not merely the
entire book.69 At the same time, it also expanded the permitted use of copy-
righted material by making a concession for derivative works, which were
not addressed under the first Act.70 Derivative works were permitted, but
only if they involved a variation of the original design.71
The second major change to the law occurred with the enactment of
Copyright Act of 1870. This Act centralized the administration of copyright
by placing the U.S. Copyright Office under the Library of Congress.72 Incor-
porating earlier changes from 1865, the Act extended to performance rights,
photography, and sculptures.73 Thus, two copies of every book, map, engrav-
ing, photograph, musical composition, periodical, and other material submit-
ted for copyright were brought to the Library of Congress, leading to an
overflow and expansion of the Library.74 In 1891, amendments to the law
gave foreign authors copyright protection of their works. 5 The Act was ap-
plied to foreigners "when [his native country] permit[ted] to citizens of the
United States of America the benefit of copyright on substantially the same
basis as [to] its own citizens; or when such foreign state or nation is a party
to an international agreement which provides for reciprocity in the granting
of copyright,. ."76 The copyright of foreign books written in English, how-
ever, was conditioned upon being printed in America or from American-
made printing plates.77
The last major revision of the Copyright Act of 1790 occurred over a
century later with the Copyright Act of 1909, which lasted unchanged for




71. First General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law, supra note 66.
72. Second General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law - Enacted by the Forty-first
Congress on July 8, 1870, http://www.ellenwhite.info/copyright-law us 1870.
htm (last visted Feb. 4, 2012).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The International Copyright Act - Amendments to the 1870 Copyright Act
Enacted by the Fifty-first Congress on March 3, 1891, http://www.el-
lenwhite.info/copyrightaw us 1891.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
76. Id.
77. Legal Protection of Digital Information, Chapter 1: An Overview of Copyright,
http://digital-law-online.info/lpdi 1.0/treatise4.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
78. Id.
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yet again, even including a catchall clause for "all the works" of an author.79
It also extended the duration of a copyright to an initial period of twenty-
eight years and a one-time renewal period of twenty-eight years.80 Further, a
copyright ran from the first publication with proper notice, instead of date of
registration and deposit, and was revoked if material was published without
notice.81
Not wanting to dispense with the current formalities of depositing books
to the Library of Congress, giving notice, and the longer period of two
twenty-eight-year terms, the United States refused to join the Berne Conven-
tion.82 Formally known as the International Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, the Convention is an international copyright
agreement adopted by an international conference in 1886.83 It was the first,
and has remained the principal international copyright convention for 100
years.84 It provided its numerous signatories-known as the Berne Copyright
Union-"with automatic protection for works first published in other coun-
tries of the Berne union and for unpublished works whose authors are citi-
zens of or residents in such other countries."85 Under the agreement,
copyright protection lasted for the lifetime of the author and only fifty years
after his or her death.6 Unlike the American system-where noncompliance
with the formalities resulted in the work going into the public domain-cop-
yright protection under the Berne Convention was granted automatically
without the need to comply with formalities.87
America entered the sphere of international copyright in 1954 under the
Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.).88 Similar to the Berne Conven-
tion, this provided non-discriminatory protection to all nationals of all mem-
ber nations for works published within their borders.89 These published
works were required to bear a prescribed notice, but unlike the Berne Con-





83. BRI-T7ANICA ACADEMIC EDITION, Berne Convention, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/62482/Beme-Convention (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).
84. LEAFFER, supra note 9, at 8.
85. Brittanica Academic Edition, supra note 83.
86. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 7, § 1
(1971), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/treaties/beme/7.html.
87. LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 8.
88. Id. at 9.
89. Id.
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for works first published within their borders.90 The United States, thus,
could maintain its fixed term provision and the requirement of deposit to the
Library of Congress.91 These formalities, however, would not last long.
C. The Copyright Act of 1976
With the introduction of new technology and various types of works,
simply amending the Copyright Act of 1909 to keep pace proved unwork-
able.92 In fact, phonorecords remained unprotected by copyright law until
1972.93 Radio broadcasts were also excluded from copyright law-most
likely because their transcripts were still sheltered under existing law.94 The
invention of television, copying machines, and later, computers challenged
the existing regime.95 The Copyright Act of 1976 was a reaction to the com-
munications revolution and is viewed by most as an entirely new body of
copyright law as opposed to a revision of the existing law. 96
The new Act made many significant changes yet helped in clarifying
more muddled areas of the law. It restructured which subject matter would
receive protection. All included subject matter was reduced to eight broad
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompany-
ing words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound record-
ings; and (8) architectural works. 97 It also preempted common law applica-
tion to copyright, thus dispensing with the dual system of federal protection
for published works and state common law protection for unpublished
works.98 This expanded the protection from published works to original
works that are "fixed in tangible medium of expression."99 It also replaced
the two, twenty-eight-year terms with a single term of the author's life plus
fifty years, which was increased to seventy years in 1998.100 The Act, how-
ever, preserved some of the existing formalities. Published works still re-
90. Id.
91. See id.
92. See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPY-




96. Id.; FRANK H. FOSTER & ROBERT L. SHOOK, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, & TRADE-
MARKS 16 (2d ed. 1993).
97. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West 2011).
98. See id. § 301.
99. See id.
100. See id. § 302(a).
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quired notice, and one's failure to affix notice of copyright could lead to its
forfeiture.101
Section 1 of the original Act granted five exclusive rights to copyright
holders: 1) the right to reproduce (copy) the work into copies and pho-
norecords; 2) the right to create derivative works of the original work; 3) the
right to distribute copies and phonorecords of the work to the public by sale,
lease, or rental; 4) the right to perform the work publicly; and 5) the right to
display the work publicly.102 Section 106 was later added, which granted
works of visual art separate and exclusive rights.103 Congress added a sixth
exclusive right to "perform[ ] . . . a sound recording publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission, other than as a part of an interactive ser-
vice, .. ."104 These are still subject to the limitations of the remaining sec-
tions of chapter one.10 5
One of the most significant changes, and the largest exception to the
rights of a copyright holder, was the statute's codification of the doctrine of
fair use.'0 6 In general, under fair use, copyrighted material could be used in a
manner that would otherwise violate copyright if for some socially beneficial
purpose. 07 This doctrine was certainly not a novel idea and has been traced
back to early 19th century common law tradition.io0 The Copyright Act of
1976 set forth the criteria for determining what constitutes fair use.10 9 Four
factors are considered when invoking this privilege: (1) the purpose and char-
acter of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount or substantiality of the portion of the original work used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.110
101. See id. §§ 401(a), 405.
102. LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 10.
103. See id. § 106.
104. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
39, 109 Stat. 336 (Nov. 1, 1995) (amending, inter alia, § 114 and § 115, title 17,
United States Code).
105. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
106. See id. § 107.
107. Id.
108. Kevin Smith, How Fair Use was Born, COPYRIGHT ISSUES AND LEGISLATION,
FAIR USE, May 21, 2009, http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2009/05/21/
how-fair-use-was-born/.
109. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
110. Id.
2012]
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III. CURRENT STATE OF COPYRIGHT IN AMERICA
A. Copyright in the Digital Age
The advent and vast expansion of the Internet drew many users to an
electronic playground, which, because of the lack of initial regulation, was
likened to the "Wild West.""' Initially, the vast number of those who flocked
to the Internet sought information without publishing content of their own."12
Naturally, demand fell on media content, which became readily accessible
with the implementation of file-share systems. The introduction of broadband
Internet access further increased the ease and speed with which files could be
located and transferred. 1 3 As a result, legislators proposed the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to inject some form of regulation. The Sen-
ate report on the DMCA's initial bill states:
"Due to the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed
worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make
their works readily available on the Internet ... without reasonable assurance
that they will be protected against massive piracy. [The DMCA] provides
this protection and creates the legal platform for launching the global digital
online marketplace for copyrighted works."114
A lobbying battle ensued on the brink of the DMCA's enactment. Copy-
right owners sought to expand traditional copyright protection in light of new
digital challenges, and many threatened to withhold participating in the mar-
ket unless Congress yielded to their demands." 5 They sought to make unlaw-
ful both an individual's circumvention of digital protection on their devices
and media and the production and sale of tools used for circumvention.,16
Opponents argued that the prohibition on circumvention would essentially
lay waste the well-established doctrine of fair use that "allowed for an oppor-
tunity to engage in independent criticism, scholarship and teaching."'l7 The
11 . See Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace & the "Devil's Hatband," 24 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 577 (2000).
112. David W. Opderbeck, Peer-to-Peer Networks, Technological Evolution, and
Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General Litigation, 20 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1685, 1697 (2005).
113. See id.
114. Peter Moore, Steal This Disk: Copy Protection, Consumers' Rights, and the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 97 N.W. U. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (2003) (cit-
ing S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998)).
115. Diane M. Barker, Defining the Contours of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act: The Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 47, 48 (2005).
116. Arnold P. Lutzker & Susan J. Lutzker, Altering the Contours of Copyright-the
DMCA and the Unanswered Questions of Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 321
Studios, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 561, 565 (2005).
117. Id.
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legislation, they argued, would essentially protect the interest of copyright
holders at the expense of the dissemination of knowledge.1i More moved by
the magnitude of the threat of digital copyright infringement, Congress ulti-
mately sided with the proponents.
President Bill Clinton signed the DMCA into law in 1998.119 It was the
first significant change to copyright law since the Copyright Act of 1976.120
In fact, it has been hailed by many as the "most sweeping revision[ ] ever to
the Copyright Act of 1976."12, According to the Senate reports, the Act es-
sentially was promulgated for two purposes: (1) to offer legal protection to
copyright owners to prevent their material from being freely shared across
the Internet, and (2) to affirm the ratification of the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO) treaties.122 WIPO is a specialized agency within
the United Nations that was established in 1967.123 It has nearly 200 member
countries and twenty-four treaties.124 Its central goal is to promote worldwide
protection of intellectual property by administering its treaties and ensuring
cooperation among its member states. 25 The adoption of the DMCA allowed
the United States to implement WIPO's "Copyright Treaty" and the "Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty."126
The DMCA's direct protective measures can be boiled down to three
primary prohibitions, all of which are found in section 1201.127 Section
1201(a)(1) prohibits the circumvention of a technologically protected mea-
sure (TPM), which "effectively controls access to a [copyrighted] work."128
This includes descrambling, decrypting, or bypassing a technological mea-
sure, without the copyright owner's authority.129 Section 1201 (a)(2) prohibits
118. Thomas A. Mitchell, Copyright, Congress, and Constitutionality: How the Dig-
ital Millennium Copyright Act Goes Too Far, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115,
2127 (2004).
119. Barker, supra note 115, at 49.
120. Grzandziel, supra note 13, at 200.
121. Moore, supra note 114, at 1437 (citing Davide Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 674 (2000)).
122. Justin D. Fitzdam, Private Enforcement of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act: Effective Without Government Intervention, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1085,
1089 (2005).
123. Centre for Innovation Law and Public Policy, Digital Copyright Reform in Ca-
nada, http://www.innovationlaw.org/archives/projects/dcr/reformlwipo.htm
(last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Mitchell, supra note 118, at 2127.
127. Lutzker, supra note 116, at 565-66.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (1998).
129. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
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the manufacturing and trafficking of devices that are used to circumvent
TPM in order to obtain unauthorized access to protected works.130 Section
1201(b) prohibits manufacturing, trafficking, or providing technology that
bypasses TPMs, which protect a copyright holder's statutory rights.'31
These anti-circumvention provisions are the backbone of the DMCA,
legally reinforcing the barricades that copyright owners began erecting on
their digital works. These obstacles, which come in the form of digital en-
cryption, serial numbers, or key files, are known as digital rights manage-
ment (DRM).132 DRM serves the legitimate purpose of protecting media
files, with the underlying goal of maximizing copyright holders' profits.133 It
developed as a result of traditional copyright's inability to prevent the distri-
bution of its copyrighted material online.34 Recording companies and artists
did not want to stand by idly while they were losing money from the illegal
downloading and sharing of their music.135 The Institute for Policy Innova-
tion estimates that online music piracy causes $12.5 billion in economic
losses each year. 36
Consumers, on the other hand, argue that DRM's effect on fair use is a
more legitimate concern than the profits of these already-wealthy figures.137
As a concession to opponents of the DMCA, Congress wrote in a handful of
qualifications to soften the blow to the doctrine of fair use. 138 Thus, the law
now exempts those who make non-infringing use of copyrighted works,
which fall into one of the classes identified by the Librarian of Congress. 139 It
also allows the Librarian of Congress to take into account the potentially
negative impact this prohibition on circumvention has on non-infringing
uses, such as education and research, for determining the scope of what con-
stitutes non-infringing use. 140 In addition, the Act exempts from liability, any
circumvention done for the purpose of law enforcement and intelligence ac-
130. Id. § 1201(a)(2).
131. Id. § 1201(b).




135. See RIAA Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.riaa.com/faq.php (last vis-
ited Sept. 10, 2012).
136. Id.
137. See Layton, supra note 132.
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
139. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(B).
140. Id. § 1201(a)(i)(C).
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tivities, encryption research, limited educational purposes, and reverse
engineering.'4'
The DMCA also addresses an internet service provider's role in the on-
line file-sharing battle. Because of the impracticability of an internet service
provider (ISP) monitoring every detail of its customers' activity, legislators
notched out a safe harbor provision to prevent a service provider's liability
for the copyright infringement of its customers.142 An ISP, which essentially
provides online services or network access, 43 can limit its liability for three
forms of communication: 1) transitory communications, 2) outside material
temporarily stored on the ISP's system, and 3) material stored on the system
by one of the ISP's users. 44 In order to take advantage of the safe harbor, the
service provider must satisfy three conditions.45 First, it can have no actual
or constructive knowledge of the infringing activity and must act expedi-
tiously to remove or disable access to the material upon becoming aware of
the infringing activity.146 Second, the service provider cannot receive any
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.147 Finally, the
service provider must promptly remove or disable access to the offending
material once they receive notice of copyright infringement.148
B. Enforcing the Law of the "Wild West"
To strengthen their effectiveness in copyright prevention and enforce-
ment, the music industry took concerted action under the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA) -a trade organization "that supports and
promotes the creative and financial vitality of the major music companies."149
The RIAA was formed in 1952 primarily to develop a uniform standard for
recording vinyl records, and currently participates in the collective rights
management of sound recording.150 The association is also behind the certifi-
cation of Gold and Platinum albums and singles in the United States.151 Its
members consist of the most influential players in the recording industry.152
141. Id. § 1201(d)-(g).
142. Id. § 512.
143. Id. § 512(k)(B).
144. Id. § 512(a)(b)(c).
145. Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
146. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
147. Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
148. Id.
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RIAA members create, manufacture, and distribute 85% of the total music
recorded and produced in the United States.153 Today, the RIAA is known for
its aggressive litigation-driven methods of enforcing its copyrights.54
At the outset, the RIAA attempted to prevent unauthorized copying and
distribution by going after the distributors of technology that allows circum-
vention.155 This type of enforcement gained the title of "gatekeeper litiga-
tion."156 For the music industry, this was the most logical step to enforce its
rights and was thought to be the most efficient solution.157 The owners of
copyrights on television programs unsuccessfully took this approach when
bringing a copyright infringement suit against the manufacturers of videotape
recorders.158 In the eye of the public, however, this was more palatable than
directly suing end-users.59
The infamous case against Napster in 2000 illustrated the strategy of the
copyright holders at that time.160 This was partly a result of the notable file
sharing software's structure. Commonly referred to as a peer-to-peer system,
Napster did not operate as such. 161 Using a semi-centralized server, the cen-
tral server essentially acted as a broker to bring together two users-one
seeking to download a file and one possessing the desired file.162 Within a
matter of minutes, a user could connect to the server and gain access to the
content list, search for the desired music file, and then connect directly to a
host computer containing that file to download it to his computer. 63 By Feb-
ruary 2001, Napster averaged an astonishing 1.57 million simultaneous users
each day.164 The centrality of its server made Napster an easy entity to enjoin.
153. Id.
154. RIAA Methods Under Scrutiny, WIRED, Aug. 15, 2003, http://www.wired.com/
entertainment/music/news/2003/08I60042.
155. Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won't Behave: Regulating P2P in the
Decade After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 565, 583 (2009).
156. Opderbeck, supra note 112, at 1699.
157. Bridy, supra note 155.
158. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
159. Id.
160. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
161. Fitzdam, supra note 122, at 1088.
162. Opderbeck, supra note 112, at 1697.
163. See Sandvine Inc., Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: The Impact of File Sharing on
Service Provider Networks, An Industry White Paper, 3-4, http://downloads.
lightreading.com/wplib/sandvine/P2P.pdf.
164. Id. (citing Report: Napster Loses that Sharing Feeling, CNN, June 28, 2001,
10:40 AM, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/TECH/intemet/06/28/napster. usage/.).
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Peaking at fifty-eight million users, the company achieved great success
before a Federal District Court in San Francisco ordered an injunction against
the company's operation in 2001-essentially shutting it down.165 The court
found that the plaintiffs presented a prima facie case for copyright infringe-
ment and that the users' activity did not amount to fair use. 166 Following the
reasoning of a similar case, the court recognized the need for balance be-
tween "a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective ... protection of
the statutory monopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in substan-
tially unrelated areas of commerce."67 Reasoning that such technology has
legitimate, non-infringing uses, the court enjoined Napster only from facili-
tating infringement, but not from distributing peer-to-peer software or operat-
ing peer-to-peer networks.168
The RIAA held Napster's downfall as a major victory. It assumed that
this file sharing would not be possible without these Napster-like centralized
servers. 169 The high demand for digital content ultimately led to decentraliza-
tion of the old regime.70 Users began to flock to true peer-to-peer systems,
which-without a central server to process the search requests-resulted in
an Internet traffic jam.17' Instead, individual computers connected to a net-
work and acted as "supernodes"-with focal points shifting as users signed
on and offline.172 This architecture of consumers acting as hubs for distribu-
tion became more prevalent as connection speeds began to increase.73
This led to the next major battle in the file sharing war-Grokster.174
The plaintiffs-consisting of songwriters, music publishers, and motion pic-
ture studios-sued Grokster for copyright infringement for its distribution of
peer-to-peer file-sharing computer networking software.175 They brought the
same arguments as the plaintiffs in Napster. 176 Unlike Napster, however, the
165. Nancy Chandross, Napster Shuts Down, ABCNEws.coM, July 27, 2001, http://
abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id= 119627&page= l#.TzHo45jG IyE.
166. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1004; Bridy, supra note 155, at 584.
167. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442
(1984).
168. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021-22.
169. Fitzdam, supra note 122, at 1098.
170. See John Borland, Democracy's Traffic Jams, CNET NEWS (Oct. 26, 2000),
http://news.cnet.com2009-1023-247379.html.
171. Id.
172. Opderbeck, supra note 112, at 1698.
173. See Borland, supra note 170.
174. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.
2004).
175. Id. at 1158.
176. Id.
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Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment order for the
defendants on the contributory negligence and vicarious liability claims.77 It
held that Grokster ultimately neither had (1) the knowledge of its users' cop-
yright infringement, which was required for contributory infringement, nor
(2) the right or ability to supervise the direct copyright infringers who used
their software, which was necessary for vicarious liability.178 Because the
company operated on a more "pure" peer-to-peer format, the court found that
Grokster did not provide the "site and facilities" for infringement like Nap-
ster's central server. 179
This case seemed to shelter pure peer-to-peer systems from secondary
liability for its users' copyright infringement.180 The district court even noted
that it was "not blind to the possibility that Defendants may have intention-
ally structured their businesses to avoid secondary liability for copyright in-
fringement, while benefiting financially from the illicit draw of their
wares."18 The Ninth Circuit recognized that the "courts [are] ill-suited to fix
the flow of internet innovation," and thus "it is prudent for [them] to exercise
caution before restructuring liability theories for the purpose of addressing
specific market abuses, despite their apparent present magnitude."182
When gatekeeper litigation proved to be ineffective, the RIAA devel-
oped a new strategy aimed at individual end-users.83 The flood of RIAA
lawsuits, with middle class Americans named as defendants, took hundreds
of routine file sharers by surprise. 184 By throwing off the gloves, the RIAA
hoped to bring awareness to the issue of piracy and educate others about the
dangers of illegal file sharing, with the hope of recovering a portion of the
lost profits in the process. 8 5 Ordinary computers became subject to serious
risk of liability, with fines of up to $150,000 per violation.186 And most users
were sharing 1,000 songs or more on file-swapping networks.187 For a brief
period, the RIAA was able to use the provisions of the DMCA to subpoena
177. Id. at 1167.
178. Id. at 1163-64.
179. Id. at 1163.
180. Fitzdam, supra note 122, at 1101.
181. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
182. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1167.
183. See John Borland, RIAA sues 261 file swappers, CNET NEWS, Sept. 8, 2003
10:57 AM, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023_3-5072564.htmi.
184. Id.
185. RIAA Continues College Deterrence Campaign Into 2008, http://www.riaa.
com/newsitem.php?id=36720A8F-FF55-2886-C2A2-EAB629C662BD.
186. Borland, supra note 183.
187. Id.
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the internet service providers to determine the identity of the users. 88 As a
result, many people simply took it on the chin and agreed to settle for far less
than initial claimed damages.189 Still, users paid anywhere from $3,000 to
$17,000.190 This also resulted in absurd situations. For example, suits were
filed against a twelve-year-old girl, an elderly woman who rarely used her
computer, and a homeless man.'91
In 2003, the D.C. Circuit's ruling in a suit against Verizon changed the
nature of the fight. 192 It held that the subpoena provisions "only [applied] to
an [internet service provider] engaged in storing on its servers material that is
infringing or the subject of infringing activity."193 Section 512(h) "does not
authorize the issuance of a subpoena to an ISP acting as a mere conduit for
the transmission of information sent by others."194 The RIAA could no longer
serve "form" subpoenas on internet service providers. 195 Instead, it was
forced to seek identities by filing "John Doe" civil suits against unknown
defendants, based on their IP addresses. 196 From there, it used discovery and
rules of procedure, working under court supervision, to learn the names of
the infringers.197
In hindsight, this approach was clearly unsuccessful on multiple levels.
End-user suits fulfilled their purpose of scaring some, but, in the end, had
little effect on the attitude or actions of the file-sharing community.98 In
2003, a study by the Pew Internet and American Life Project found that
sixty-seven percent of Americans downloading music said they did not care
whether the music was copyrighted.99 From a purely financial perspective,
188. Defending the Constitutional Rights of Internet Users and ISPs, SUBPOENA DE-
FENSE ALLIANCE, http://www.subpoenadefense.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
189. Borland, supra note 183.
190. Id.
191. The 14 Most Ridiculous Lawsuits Filed by the RIAA and the MPAA, BRAINZ,
http://brainz.org/14-most-ridiculous-lawsuits-filed-riaa-and-mpaa/ (last visited
Feb. 8, 2012).
192. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351
F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
193. Id. at 1233.
194. Id. at 1237.
195. Opderbeck, supra note 112, at 1704-05.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See generally Bridy, supra note 155, at 601-610 (discussing the ineffectiveness
of the industry to reshape file sharing norms through educational programs that
have been both punitive and propagandistic in character).
199. Amanda Lenhart & Mary Madden, Music Downloading, File-sharing and Cop-
yright, PEW INTERNET (Jul 31, 2003), http://pewintemet.org/Reports/2003[Mu-
sic-Downloading-Filesharing-and-Copyright/Data-Memo.aspx
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the cost far exceeded the worth. In the three-year period from 2006 to 2008,
the RIAA spent $64 million on the lawsuit campaign to only recover $1.4
million.200
In the end, technology-pushed by consumer demand-would continue
to outpace the law, making individual end-users even more difficult to trace.
Torrent downloading, which came on the scene in 2001, is currently the big-
gest threat to the RIAA.201 The American copyright system has sprung a leak,
and each time new law or judicial action patches it up, another leak forms.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Why the DMCA must be changed
Since its introduction, the DMCA has had vehement opposition. The
most prevalent argument raised against the new law is that it nearly destroys
a purchaser's right to fair use. As mentioned, fair use is a well-established
component of American copyright law-"the principle that the public is enti-
tled, without having to ask permission, to use copyrighted works in ways that
do not unduly interfere with the copyright owner's market for a work."202
While this is a legitimate interest-which must be balanced against cop-
yright owners' interest in protecting their work from exploitation-the law
seems to more heavily favor copyright protection, with little concession to
proponents of fair use. The existence of the DMCA is likely the result of the
influence of money and power. The RIAA, consisting of the most influential
artists and media conglomerates in America, has a nearly limitless source of
wealth to mobilize lobbyists to fight for its interests. It also has the ability to
throw its weight toward certain political figures and their causes in return for
getting its own back scratched.
So why do consumers care so much about fair use? Because it allows
them the freedom to use legitimately purchased media without restriction.
DRM and other anti-circumvention devices limit the use of digital music and
eBooks to a single device. Moreover, it prevents the backup and storage of
such files, which can easily be lost, deleted, or become corrupted. The fair
use exception written in to the DMCA is more of a gesture to appease fair
use proponents than an actual protection. It allows true fair use for a limited
pool of individuals. Writing in a case where RealNetworks, Inc. was sued for
200. See Mike Masnick, RIAA Spent $17.6 Million In Lawsuits... To Get $391,000
In Settlements?, TECHDIRT, July 14, 2010 9:44 AM, http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20100713/17400810200.shtml.
201. See generally Emesto, RIAA Wants to Shutter Torrent Sites, and More, TOR-
RENT FREAK, Nov. 16, 2011, http://torrentfreak.com/riaa-wants-to-shutter-tor-
rent-sites-and-more-l 1116/ (discussing RIAA's support for SOPA, which
would shut down a large number of torrent domains without due process).
202. Unintended Consequences: Twelve Years Under the DMCA, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Mar. 3, 2010, https://www.eff.org/wp/unintended-con-
sequences-under-dmca.
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manufacturing CD ripping software, Judge Patel recognizes the catch-22 na-
ture of the issue. He acknowledges that". . . while it may well be fair use for
an individual consumer to store a backup copy of a personally-owned DVD
on that individual's computer, a federal law has nonetheless made it illegal to
manufacture or traffic in a device or tool that permits a consumer to make
such copies."203 Thus, a person theoretically has the right to circumvent digi-
tal blocks for non-infringing use, yet must do so without the help of devices
designed for that purpose. The average American certainly does not have the
requisite technical knowledge to do so. A theoretical right is no right at all.
Opponents also claim that the DMCA stifles free expression. The most
prominent case, and the first prosecution under the DMCA, was against a
Russian citizen and employee of a Moscow-based corporation, ElcomSoft.204
Dmitry Sklyarov was a programmer who had developed a software package
that decrypts electronic books. He was arrested in Las Vegas in 2001 and
was charged with trafficking and offering to the public a software program
that could circumvent technological protections on copyrighted material
under section 1201 (b)(l)(A) of the DMCA.205 The Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation argues that his program promotes the full expression of free exercise
and fair use rights. Specifically, it allows the ability 1) to read eBooks on a
computer other than the one purchased for; 2) to read eBooks on an operating
system other than Macintosh or Windows; 3) to make a backup copy of an
eBook 4) to access the eBook on a new computer when the old one becomes
obsolete; 5) to print out an eBook; or 6) to loan or sell an eBook to a
friend.206 More strictly, it prohibits the non-infringing uses of copying
passages for educational use or using text-to-speech for the visually
impaired.207
With such imbalance between fair use and copyright protection, the gen-
eral public-unable to engage in fair use without aid from third-party tech-
nologies-simply cannot exercise that privilege. One is forced to either break
the law and face potential criminal charges, or forego the circumvention and
sacrifice whatever activity it would have promoted. This will ultimately chill
the legitimate activities of professors, journalists, publishers, scientists, stu-
dents, programmers, and general members of the public.
Additionally, it has been argued that the DMCA impedes competition.208
Several companies now realize how useful the DMCA can be in preventing
203. Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 942
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111,
1125 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
204. Moore, supra note 114, at 1455.
205. US v. ElcomSoft Sklyarov, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.
eff.org/cases/us-v-elcomsoft-sklyarov (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
206. Moore, supra note 114, at 1456.
207. Id.
208. See Unintended Consequences, supra note 201.
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other companies from entering a specific market. Competing companies are
now forced to "tread softly" for fear of being sued for a misstep. For exam-
ple, in April 2005, a Massachusetts programmer named Dave Coffin discov-
ered that camera-maker Nikon was encrypting certain portions of
uncompressed "raw" photos produced by its professional-grade digital cam-
eras. 209 This proprietary encryption prevented the files' compatibility with
third-party software, forcing developers of Photoshop and other similar im-
age software to obtain licenses from Nikon.210 To put it simply, Nikon was
obtaining market leverage in the image editing software market through en-
crypting its own files. Thomas Knoll, the creator of Photoshop, expressed
concerns of Nikon's competitors in his refusal to fully support the decrypted
files for fear of violating the broad circumvention provisions of the
DMCA.211
Inserted comma.
Lexmark, one of the largest laser printer makers in the United States,
made similar use of the DMCA to advance its market interests. 212 With the
intent to eliminate the secondary market in refilled laser toner cartridges,
Lexmark took an approach similar to Nikon.213 By adding authentication rou-
tines between its printers and cartridges, Lexmark squeezed out aftermarket
vendors and forced consumers to buy from them.214 When Static Control
Components (SCC) reverse-engineered these measures to enable refilled car-
tridges to work in Lexmark printers and sold them for profit, Lexmark
brought suit and obtained an injunction.215 They complained that the
"Smarteck" chips contained "unauthorized, identical copies of Lexmark's
copyrighted Toner Loading Programs."216 In the end, SCC succeeded in
overturning the injunction on appeal, but it took nineteen months of costly
litigation during which time its product was withheld from the market.217
While SCC came out victorious, Lexmark was able to sufficiently frustrate a
large portion of the company's time and finances, and send a chilling mes-
sage to similarly postured competitors. The DMCA was originally intended
209. Declan McCullagh, Nikon's Photo Encryption Reported Broken, CNET NEWS,




212. See Unintended Consequences, supra note 201.
213. Declan McCullagh, Lexmark Invokes DMCA In Toner Suit, CNET NEWS, Jan.
8, 2003 7:28 PM, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-979791.html.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.; See Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522
(6th Cir. 2004).
217. See Unintended Consequences, supra note 2011.
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as a shield to protect copyright holders and prevent piracy, yet companies
have harnessed it as a sword to keep competitors a safe distance from the
market.
Inserted (West 2008)_
Considered reversing to Thus, Plaintiffs...
.The DMCA has had other consequences not intended by Congress. It
has threatened to displace state and federal computer intrusion laws. Specifi-
cally, the DMCA could jeopardize the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA), the Wiretap Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA), and a range of state computer intrusion statutes.218 Generally, these
statutes contain provisions that a plaintiff must prove that the intrusion
caused some harm. For instance, under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a
plaintiff must show that the alleged violation "caused ...loss to [one] or
more persons during any 1-year period .. .aggregating at least $5,000 in
value."219 The CFAA defines the term "loss" to mean "any reasonable cost to
any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a dam-
age assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service."220 The
DMCA, on the other hand, contains no financial damage requirement. It
gives the court the authority to "grant temporary and permanent injunctions
on such terms as it deems reasonable to prevent or restrain a violation."221 It
also provides for the recovery of anywhere from $200 to $2,500 for each act
of circumvention of a device, product, or component, "as the court considers
just."222 Plaintiffs, thus, used the DMCA as a route around the actual damage
threshold of some of the other computer intrusion statutes. 223 This will likely
continue until more precedent is laid to reign in such misuse of the DMCA.
218. Id.
219. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (West 2008).
220. Id. § 1030(e)(l 1).
221. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1203(b)(1).
222. Id. .§ 1203(c)(3)(A).
223. See Pearl Investments, LLC v. Standard I/0, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D. Me.
2003) (rejecting the company's electronic trespass and CFAA claims for gain-
ing unauthorized access to an automated stock-trading computer system's vir-
tual private network due to lack of evidence of any actual damage done, yet
upholding the DMCA circumvention claim for the same); See also Tick-
etmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Technologies, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1113 (C.D.
Cal. 2007) (".... because [Ticketmaster] has not quantified its harm as required
by the statute or even attempted to show what portion of the harm is attributa-
ble to [RMG], the Court cannot find that [Ticketmaster] has affirmatively
shown that its harm caused by [RMG] exceeds the $ 5,000 minimum. Thus, the
CFAA claim does not provide a basis for a preliminary injunction.").
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Recent developments, however, have limited the DMCA's reach and
given hope to opponents of the controversial act.2 2 4 The Federal and Fifth
Circuits have made rulings essentially requiring a plaintiff in a DMCA suit to
prove copyright infringement.225 In Storage Tech, a Fifth Circuit case, the
plaintiff sold data storage software and provided maintenance repair services
to large enterprise clients.226 Its competitor, Custom Hardware, provided sim-
ilar repair services. StorageTek, however, password-protected its software
solely to prevent independent service providers such as Custom Hardware
from using maintenance software included in its hardware systems.227 It sued
Custom Hardware under the DMCA, arguing that it had circumvented those
passwords with the intention to force its customers to obtain repair services
from them.228
After reversing the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction
against Custom Hardware more than a year after it was granted, the Federal
Circuit wrote that "[t]o the extent that [Custom Hardware's] activities do not
constitute copyright infringement or facilitate copyright infringement,
StorageTek is foreclosed from maintaining an action under the DMCA."229 In
other words, a plaintiff must prove that a circumvention of technological
measure either "infringes or facilitates infringing a right protected by Copy-
right Act."230 Many DMCA opponents viewed this as a victory, hoping that
other courts would follow this lead.
The Fifth Circuit took a similar step in MGE v. GE to limit the reach of
the DMCA.231 MGE produced uninterruptible power supply machines, many
of which required the use of certain programs during servicing.32 MGE de-
veloped and copyrighted these software programs, which required an exter-
nal hardware security key known as a "dongle."233 Years after MGE
introduced these security programs, hackers discovered how to crack them,
224. Tim Armstrong, Is the DMCA Still Controversial? INFORMATION, LAW, AND
THE LAW OF INFORMATION, Aug. 20, 2010, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/info-
lawI20 O/08/20/is-the-dmca-still-controversial/.
225. See id.
226. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d
1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
227. Id.
228. Unintended Consequences, supra note 201.
229. Storage Tech. Corp., 421 F.3d at 1318.
230. Id. (citing Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d
1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
231. MGE LPS Sys., Inc. v. GE Consumer & Indus., Inc., 622 F.3d 361 (5th Cir.
2010).
232. Id. at 364.
233. Id.
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disclosing their findings on the Internet234 When a hacker overcame the se-
curity key, he could use the software without any restriction.35 When the
employees of GE/PMI, a machine-serving company, obtained a copy of
MGE's software, MGE sued for copyright infringement, misappropriation of
trade secrets, unfair competition, conversion, and DMCA violations.236
Tailoring the issue, the court asked whether GE/PMI's representatives
circumvented a technological measure, not whether they used circumvented
technology to access MGE's software.237 The court narrowly applied
§ 1201(a)(1), the DMCA's anti-circumvention provision, reasoning that be-
cause the provision "is targeted at circumvention, it does not apply to the use
of copyrighted works after the technological measure has been circum-
vented."238 Such a broad "construction would extend the DMCA beyond its
intended purposes" to regulate conduct that is already addressed by existing
copyright law.239
Additionally, the Librarian of Congress has been adding new exceptions
to the DMCA under its ability to exempt classes of materials from the anti-
circumvention provision as long as it is used for a non-infringing purpose. 240
The DMCA mandates that every three years the U.S. Copyright Office re-
view requests for specific classes of work to be exempted, and then recom-
mends that the Library of Congress adopt certain exemptions241 Most
notably, the Library of Congress has ruled that consumers who "jailbreak"
their iPhone or circumvent digital protections to install unapproved applica-
tions for non-infringing uses will be exempt from prosecution under the anti-
circumvention provision.242 The Library of Congress reasoned that such
modifications that are "purely for the purpose of ... interoperability are fair
uses."243 Furthermore, in 2010, the Library created an exception allowing the
circumvention of movies on DVD's that were protected by the Content
Scrambling System when done to incorporate portions of the film into a new
234. Id.
235. Id.
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work for comment or criticism.244 It also permitted such circumvention
"where the person engaging in circumvention believes and has reasonable
grounds for believing that circumvention is necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the use in the following instances: (i) Educational uses by college and univer-
sity professors and by college and university film and media studies students;
(ii) Documentary filmmaking; (iii) Noncommercial videos."245
These cases demonstrate how judges-who are beginning to see the im-
practicability of the DMCA and the potential for abuse-are making judg-
ments that consider the balance of all interests, not just copyrights holders.
While those who feel the DMCA is harmful to free speech, fair use, and the
rights of consumers, can celebrate progress in the right direction, their oppo-
nents have not relented.
B. New Developments
Advocates of strong copyright protection, such as the Motion Picture
Association of American (MPAA) and the RIAA, have also recently backed
new legislation that would bring combating Internet piracy to a new level.
The Stop Online Privacy Act (SOPA) and Protect IP Act (PIPA) were intro-
duced into Congress with the intention of strengthening the protection
against copyright infringement and intellectual property theft. Opponents ar-
gue that it would stifle expression and censor Internet content. Essentially,
the PIPA would force the U.S. internet providers to block access to websites
deemed as enablers of copyright infringement and allow corporations and the
government to sue search engines, blog sites, directories, or any site in gen-
eral to remove the black listed sites.246 SOPA is broader than the PIPA, al-
lowing the U.S. attorney general to block domain name services and de-list
websites from search engines. 247 This would ultimately push a workable solu-
tion to the copyright problem in the opposite direction.
C. Possible Solutions
Copyright has taken a drastic turn from its original purpose of encourag-
ing the dissemination of literature toward fostering private gain. It has be-
come primarily a mechanism to protect the interests of authors and creators
when it should be reformed to serve the original purpose of maintaining and
replenishing a rich cultural public domain and encouraging new forms of
244. Nate Anderson, Library of Congress Asks: How Should We Let You Break
DRM?, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011 0/library-of-congress-
asks-how-should-we-let-you-break-drm.ars (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).
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expression. One commonly advanced change attempts to revive copyright's
original purpose in America by reverting to the British system of archiving
all copyrights in a central database. By then requiring each work to be
marked to express the intentions of the author, others would be on notice of
what constitutes infringement.
Furthermore, shortening copyright duration would aid in expanding the
public domain. Under the current copyright law, a copyright lasts for the life
span of a creator plus an additional seventy years 248 Opponents have argued
that the law overreaches, stifling innovation. This essentially gives an author
a monopoly over his or her work and prevents others from building on that
expression to create new works. Some have suggested reducing the term to
the lifespan of the author plus fifty years, or even as low as twenty-five
years. More aggressive proponents of change suggest getting back to the
original fourteen-year term, with an optional renewal term of fourteen years,
which would give an author a period of protection, yet allow the work to
more readily become public domain.249
Another approach relies on the market to correct any imbalances. It is
most useful in regard to copyright protection of digital music files. This
would help reduce Internet piracy, stimulate copyright holders' economic
gain, and meet the needs of consumers. The explosion in popularity of Nap-
ster revealed two types of consumers: (1) those who wanted interoperable
digital music, and (2) those who merely wanted free music.250 The market
approach allows content providers to use infringement data to reveal con-
sumer demand. Companies can use this information to fulfill the demand.
Apple's development of iTunes is a prime example of this theory in
action. Apple introduced iTunes to fulfill the high consumer demand for digi-
tal content.251 The company filled the vacuum left by the demise of Napster
with an innovative, yet legitimate business model. It provided albums and
individual songs at relatively inexpensive prices.252 Moreover, it did so in an
intuitive fashion-offering hardware that integrated with the web-based sys-
tem. Allowing the market to work out the kinks in the system would incen-
tivize acquiring copyrighted material legitimately. Moreover, competition
would drive down the cost to consumers, thus making the legitimate
purchase of digital music more appealing.
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A more extreme proposal of copyright reform calls for the total elimina-
tion of copyright. The leading proponent, Raymond Ku, suggests that copy-
right can be safely discarded entirely.253 He views copyright law not as
protecting an author's natural right in his work, but as representing "a bar-
gain between the public and the author in which the public grants the author
certain exclusive rights in exchange for access to her creation."254 As such,
he contends that the current copyright law has become so tainted that it
should simply be eliminated all together. He questions the two interests cur-
rently served by copyright: creation and public dissemination.255 Because
consumers build and fund the distribution channels for digital content them-
selves, copyright is no longer needed to encourage distribution.56 Ku argues
that copyright has allowed large record labels to exert excessive influence
over what music gets heard, leading to the homogenization of music, which
is contrary to the original purpose of promoting creativity.257 Eliminating
copyright would promote creativity by encouraging the use of others' works
to produce new works.
New technologies and business models continue to emerge that attempt
to balance the competing interests of consumer demand and copyright pro-
tection. One specific model, Spotify, has been surprisingly successful in
striking such a balance. The platform is a DRM-based music streaming ser-
vice.258 Non-subscribing users can listen to an unlimited amount of streamed
music, with occasional visual and audio advertisements.259 By offering appli-
cations for desktop and mobile devices, the problem of interoperability that
plagues other DRM protected music is no longer an issue. The service is
funded by individuals who pay for a monthly subscription, advertisements,
and partner retailers' music purchases.260 Because users do not possess digital
copies of the music, but stream it anytime there is Internet connectivity, the
music cannot be shared. A user essentially has access to more music than
would be possible if storing the actual files on a standard mobile device. The
downfall, however, is that the music is accessible only where there is an
Internet connection. Also, because the platform is limited to streaming music,
a user cannot use portions of the files for educational purposes. In this case,
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one would be pushed toward purchasing DRM-free music from systems such
as iTunes.
D. Conclusion
It is undisputed that copyright law has veered from its original purpose
of encouraging creativity and promoting education. The current law incor-
rectly views copyright as a property-like interest, thus serving the interests of
copyright holders at the expense of the public. The DMCA has granted the
music industry too much power to protect its financial stakes, which has led
to Internet censorship and has chilled musical creativity. The influx of in-
fringement and circumvention claims demonstrate how the law has become a
tool used to force out competition and increase profits If copyright is going to
maintain its original purpose, lawmakers must look beyond copyright holders
and their lobbying efforts to the interest of the public.

